T he purpose of the patent system, as reflected in Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, is to ''promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive rights to their respective writings and discoveries.'' While the world in which we now live has changed a great deal since the drafters of the Constitution completed their work, the patent system has served the United States well, and has demonstrated its ability to adapt to dramatic economic and scientific changes.
As is often the case when a new area of science or technology emerges, some have argued that the application of the current U.S. patent system to a new category of invention, in this case genebased inventions, will have a negative impact on innovation and the economy. 1 This commentary argues that modification to the patent system to discriminate against a particular category of inventions, in this case genebased inventions, will not achieve the patent law's goal of promoting progress in science and the useful arts. It also argues that concerns directed towards the consequences of gene patent owners' behavior are more appropriately addressed by antitrust laws and health care legislation, including health care funding policies that deal more directly with issues relating to the cost and availability of novel diagnostics and therapeutics. Finally, to the extent that many gene patents owned by public or nonprofit research institutions result from publicly-funded research, this article proposes that legislation establishing policies regarding the licensing of such publicly-funded gene patents, at least in the research field of use, would go far in addressing concerns expressed regarding the impact of gene patents on life sciences research.
SCIENCE AND THE LAW OF GENE PATENTS
Much of the discussion of patents on gene-based inventions reflects misunderstandings regarding both the nature of the inventions themselves and the legal principles that are fundamental to our patent system. We begin this commentary by attempting to dispel some of the more common of such misunderstandings. Those who oppose patents on genebased inventions often argue that patents shouldn't be allowed on genes or genomic sequences because they are products of nature. Therefore, it is important that those who participate in this discussion understand clearly the difference between genomic sequence, which exists in nature, and gene-based inventions, for which patent protection is appropriate.
It is true that human genes have existed for at least as long as humans have existed. Until recently, however, no gene has ever been used by humans to diagnose or cure disease. The inventive steps of isolating a gene, determining its function, and putting it into a commercially useful format form the basis for the promise of the genomic revolution in health care, and entitle inventors to patents on their inventions. These steps transform a product of nature into an isolated, purified product that has realworld utility for research, diagnosis, and therapy.
Genomic sequences as used in this context are sequences obtained by sequencing an organism's chromosomes, which make up its genome. In the case of humans and most eucaryotes, the vast majority of chromosomal or genomic DNA does not code for protein.
In fact, only 3% of human chromosomal DNA encodes protein. As a consequence, most genomic DNA cannot be patented simply by sequencing it, without knowing more about the sequence than what it is-there must be something about it that gives it a utility beyond the desire to know what it does, e.g., its biological function, or some other utility.
On the other hand, gene sequences as used in this context are nucleotide (e.g., DNA and RNA) sequences that encode protein. It is of particular importance to understand that DNA sequences that encode protein are almost never ''obvious'' or easily discernable from the chromosomal DNA sequences in which they are buried. This is because most genes are made up of distinct partial pieces of coding DNA (exons) that are scattered between noncoding sequences (introns) on the chromosomal (genomic) DNA, and the signals that the RNA expression machinery uses to determine the start, stop, and junction points of the coding regions to make the protein are still very poorly understood. Even the most complex computer algorithms being used today for gene discovery from chromosomal DNA are quite poor at accurately picking out the exact start and stop sites of each gene, much less of multiple start and stop sites of the exons that make up the full-length protein.
In fact, the elucidation of most gene sequences is the result of one or more much more complex discovery processes that involve isolating not genomic DNA, but rather the messenger RNA that results from the transcription of genomic sequences in the region comprising the coding sequences, which RNA sequences are then processed by the cell's RNA expression machinery into processed mRNA that has had the noncoding intronic RNA transcript spliced out. While it might seem ''obvious'' that this mRNA would be what should be sequenced, and thus gene sequence discovery would simply be a matter of isolating and purifying this ''product of nature,'' the problem is far more complex. This is because mRNA is a very ephemeral and unstable molecule, and occurs in vanishingly small amounts per cell at any given time, making it almost impossible to isolate a sufficient amount of it intact, e.g., without degradation by intracellular enzymes, in order to sequence it. In fact, it is almost exclusively the case that cellular mRNA has to be artificially transcribed into a product that does not occur naturally, cDNA (''complementary DNA''), which is more stable, and can be cloned in order to make many copies of it, and thus to make it possible to sequence it.
The conventional method of isolating and sequencing a gene generally involves looking for a precise biological function, exhaustively attempting to find and purify enough of the protein to sequence a few amino acids of that sequence, and making DNA probes corresponding to all the possible nucleotide combinations that might encode these several amino acids. The entire mRNA complement of the cell suspected of expressing the protein is then cloned, after transforming it into cDNA, and the probes designed from the partial protein sequence are used to try to fish out the coding sequence for the particular gene from the very complex mixture of cDNAs that correspond to the cellular mRNA
The vast majority of gene sequences discovered during the past several years has been determined as a result of a different process, one that turns the paradigm of the conventional method upside-down. Rather than looking for the gene that encodes a particular biological function, the new tools of highthroughput DNA sequencing have allowed gene sequences to be identified a priori from cDNA, and then functionality is determined by a variety of techniques, including ''homology analysis,'' which compares the structural relationship between the newly determined sequence and already known sequences.
Other methods for determining gene function include the use of microarraybased expression analysis to identify correlations between gene expression and disease or drug response. It is this process that seems to have raised the concerns-and the ire-of those who now complain that gene patenting is ''unfair.'' The reasons for this ''unfairness,'' as we discuss below, seem to be primarily emotional rather than factual -the complaints tend to center on the assertions that high-throughput sequencing is ''too easy'' to qualify for patent protection and that elucidating gene sequences is ''discovery'' rather than invention. Both of the issues complained of under the rubric of ''unfairness'' must be examined under the tenets of patent law, not in view of the emotion-laden prejudice against how the science behind the genomic approach to medical research compares with conventional discovery or invention methods.
First, the patent statutes do not permit, and explicitly eschew, any distinctions being made in patentability based on the degree of difficulty of the work involved. As stated clearly in the Federal Patent Statutes: ''Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.'' 2 Thus, no ''flash of genius'' is required for patentability; rather, even a random ''trialand-error'' effort to solve a problem is all that is necessary.
3 It does not matter whether a gene is discovered by a search for a specific source of a biological activity, or a biological activity or other utility is ascribed to a gene sequence determined by another method. The ''difficulty'' of the intellectual process is irrelevant to patentability. Second, and perhaps even more important, is that despite what is repeatedly asserted by the opponents of gene patenting, patent law applies equally to ''discoveries'' as to ''inventions. ' Finally, a fourth issue that is often misunderstood by both scientists and the Patent Office alike is what constitutes a patentable utility for a gene sequence. As with any other composition of matter (as compared with a claim to a process or method of use), all that is required by the patent statutes, as well as over 200 years of patent law as elucidated by our federal courts, including the Supreme Court, is that a single utility be disclosed by a patent applicant in order to obtain a patent claim to the composition of matter for all uses. That utility need not be the best or most important use of that composition of matter, only a practical, ''real-world'' use. 5 The apparent anomaly that disclosure of the absolute, laboratory-determined biological activity of a gene is not the only real-world use of a gene sequence sufficient to establish a patentable utility under the patent statutes is one that seems counterintuitive to the general public and to the Patent Office as well. It is, nevertheless, the law, and has been for over 200 years. Nothing presented in the accompanying papers has set forth any evidence or sound scientific or economic reasoning to support a change in those laws or the policies underlying them.
THE PATENT SYSTEM'S ROLE IN PROMOTING INNOVATION
A patent is essentially a transaction between a patent applicant and the government, in which the government grants the applicant a limited right to exclude others from making, using, or selling an invention, provided that the invention represents sufficient innovation over the then state of the art, in exchange for the patent applicant's complete disclosure of the invention. 6 The patent system assumes that limited protection against ''free rides'' by the inventor's potential competitors is necessary to avoid disincentives to innovation. The President's Council of Economic Advisors recently articulated the policy underlying the patent system as follows:
[I]n many cases, firms or individuals might not embark on developing an innovation because, although the social benefit from it may be large enough to justify its development costs, the firm or individual could not expect to reap enough of that benefit to justify those costs. The consequences of this problem were recognized in the U.S. Constitution, which empowered Congress to develop a body of intellectual property laws, including those establishing patents. A patent for an invention confers on an individual or firm (the patent holder) limited rights to exclude others from making, selling, or using the invention without the patent holder's consent. . . . Patents give a firm the legal power to keep others from using its innovation to create competing products without bearing the cost of the innovation. . . . Thus policy has long recognized that, to encourage innovation, firms must expect that successful innovations will yield a market position that allows them to earn profits adequate to compensate for the risk and cost of their efforts. 7 Concerns about free riders are most severe in cases in which the innovation is either expensive or risky to develop, but easy to copy. Pharmaceutical products provide one example of a category of product that is expensive and risky to develop, but easily copied, which may go a long way to explaining why participants in the pharmaceutical and biological industry ascribe a relatively high degree of importance to patents as a means to capture the benefits of innovation. 8 The same could be said of gene-based innovations; the cost of isolating and characterizing a gene, and of putting it into a commercially viable format, can be very expensive, but once the discovery is complete, the gene is easily duplicated.
The U.S. patent system does not distinguish between categories of invention in determining either eligibility for patent protection or the scope of rights afforded the patent owner. Indeed, provided that they meet the legal requirements of novelty and lack of obviousness, and provided that the patent applicant complies with his or her disclosure obligations, the patent law protects ''anything under the sun that is made by man.'' 9 The scope of patent claims to which an inventor is entitled is a function of the breadth of the invention disclosure provided in the patent application, the sufficiency of that disclosure in supporting the claims sought, and the extent of the relevant prior art. 10 Thus, the genius of the patent system is that it permits the application of the principles applicable to the patent transaction across the many generations of innovation that our country has witnessed, without the necessity of constant legislative adjustments to reflect economic and scientific development. Contrary to the assertions in the articles in this issue by Murashige and Scherer, however, U.S. patent law does not assume any particular stage of economic development, just as it does not attempt to promote differing policies applicable to differing ''innovation markets'' in different technologies or sectors of the economy.
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That said, as the U. S. economy has become increasingly dependent on technological innovation and services, it is hardly surprising that patents and other forms of legal protection for intellectual assets have received more attention as a component of competitiveness. 12 It is for this reason that the United States has consistently adhered to the position, reflected in the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, that countries should not in their patent systems discriminate between categories of inventions.
Despite these key lessons learned from over 200 years of patent law history, periodically a major new category of innovation emerges, for which commentators claim that the current intellectual property system is either inadequate or inappropriate.
14 The accompanying articles by Murashige, Barton, and Scherer all claim that the application of current patent law to gene-based inventions is problematic, particularly insofar as it applies to the use and licensing of genes for research use. They respond to the issues by proposing new rules that would apply to specific categories of inventions, with principal focus on the use of gene-based inventions as research tools (and in Barton's case, diagnostics).
The principal drawback to this approach, aside from its obvious inconsistency with the most recent version of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 15 is that virtually any category that one could propose for special treatment, including those proposed by Murashige, Barton, and Scherer, is very likely to be both over-and under-inclusive in its attempt to provide appropriate incentives for innovation.
For example, all three raise issues relating to the application of patents to ''research tool'' uses of genes. Murashige and Barton argue for expanded research exemptions from patent protection. There are three basic difficulties with their arguments.
First, if the purpose of the patent system is to create incentives for innovation, then research tools, which by their use inherently promote further innovation, would seem particularly appropriate subjects for patent protection. In this context, the position taken against a patent reward for creating an innovation that will enable further innovation seems particularly perverse.
Second, the recent acceleration of genomic research confirms this assumption, and argues against Barton's and Murashige's proposals. The recent completion of the first draft of the human genome would not have been possible without the availability of off-the-shelf research tools, such as automated sequencing machines and large-scale computing systems. Similarly, the pace of the discovery and characterization of genes will depend on the availability of a range of genomic tools, such as microarrays and other functional genomic tools. The types of companies that provide such products, typically small companies without publicly-traded securities and those whose securities are traded over the counter, are precisely those for whom Scherer finds patents most important. 16 Cockburn has similarly noted the emergence of a new category of economic participant in the life sciences sector, which he identifies as the supplier of ''enabling products and technologies.'' 17 A patent policy that is hostile to research tools and their developers will certainly not encourage the development of products that promise to accelerate research processes and make them more efficient.
Third, as the above makes clear, there is no principled way to distinguish between a gene-based invention and any other research tool, since any right to exclude that applies to research could theoretically be invoked to inhibit research. Thus, if one adopts the logic of Barton, Scherer, and Murashige, their concerns about patent rights in research tools would apply equally to sequencing machines, assays, PCR, and the Cohen-Boyer methods of making recombinant DNA. As Scherer's article confirms, to the extent that we rely on the private sector to provide these products on an off-the-shelf basis, the absence of exclusionary patent rights will surely inhibit their development. 18 In a similar vein, Scherer proposes that ''[t]o ensure that promising future lines of research are not impeded, existing genome patent claims and any claims allowed in the future ought to be interpreted narrowly. '' 19 This blanket approach fails to calibrate the scope of the inventor's rights to his or her contribution to the development of the relevant science. Thus, for example, if a gene encodes a protein that the inventor has determined is itself a therapeutic, it is difficult to understand why the inventor should not be entitled to the same scope of protection to which the inventor of a synthetic, ''small molecule'' chemical drug would be entitled.
Barton creates a similar conundrum in his apparent distinction between ''products,'' such as drugs, for which patent protection is appropriate, and ''information about the world or . . . abstract methods of using such information,'' for which patent protection would be denied. 20 This distinction merely shifts the argument to one of definitions, without yielding clear or principled outcomes. Is the discovery of a highly specific association between a gene and a disease mere ''information about the world?'' Should the discoverer be entitled to a patent on the gene or its use as a diagnostic? Why should it matter whether the patent claims the use of the gene itself as a diagnostic, rather than a particular diagnostic kit? In all of these cases, the principal innovation was the provision of the gene sequence and discovery of the gene's disease association, which sequence enabled, and is used in, the diagnostic method. Why should the resulting patent rights depend on whether the innovation is characterized as ''information'' or a ''product''?
21 These definitional issues demonstrate that the research tools proposals merely reflect a preconceived notion of the undesirability of gene patents for research. Their proponents' inability to distinguish gene-based inventions from other categories of useful innovations that have research applications demonstrates that they will yield arbitrary results and may in fact have serious negative consequences for the acceleration of biological research.
THE PATENT LAW AND EXPLOITATION OF PATENTED INVENTIONS
Many of the objections to gene patents are based on assumptions regarding the way in which such patents might be asserted to limit or otherwise interfere with research. 22 For example, Barton argues that ''the possibility that licenses may have to be sought from a variety of different holders of sequence patents may pose prohibitive complications in developing, marketing or using a multipurpose chip. '' 23 As a threshold matter, it is interesting to note that none of the commentators lamenting the likely development of a gene patent ''thicket'' has produced evidence that research has in any way decelerated as a consequence of gene patenting. While Merz has produced some evidence that individual researchers may have terminated individual research projects as a consequence of intellectual property disputes, 24 the evidence falls far short of indicating that there has been any aggregate reduction in biological research as a consequence of gene patenting.
Proponents of gene patent reform obscure the paucity of evidence to support their position by hypothesizing that a patent owner ''may'' refuse to license his or her invention. It is, of course, the case that a patent confers the right to exclude others; the U.S. patent laws have for the most part not concerned themselves with how the patent owner chooses to exercise his or her exclusionary right.
Patents give a firm the legal power to keep others from using its innovation to create competing products without bearing the cost of the innovation. Licensing provides a means whereby the innovator can receive compensation, in the form of licensing fees, from others that find a beneficial use of the innovation. 25 In other words, having conferred the exclusionary benefit of a patent, the patent laws assume that the inventor will maximize its perceived value to him or her, consistent with the market demand for the innovation. 26 This does not mean that the patent owner's behavior is unconstrained.
Principles of patent misuse, developed over the years by the courts, make a patent unenforceable if the patent owner tries to exploit his or her patent right in a way that confers competitive advantage over unpatented subject matter. 27 Antitrust laws regulate (anti-) competitive behavior, including the behavior of patent owners. 28 And, of course, depending on the sector in question, various types of legislation affect the conduct of economic participants, including patent owners.
Health care is obviously one area in which there is a strong public interest that may, where appropriate, result in legislation or other regulation. Where that is the case, it is important that the policy issues be addressed directly, rather than indirectly through the patent system. It has never been the role of the patent system to establish industrial policy with respect to any particular category of invention or sector of the economy.
For example, Barton proposes a number of alternative solutions to what he believes are negative consequences of gene patents on diagnostics. 29 Barton's concerns are representative of those articulated by many clinical geneticists, such as Dr. Debra Leonard, Director of the Molecular Pathology Laboratory of the University of Pennsylvania Health System, who complains:
We may have spent years developing these tests, and educating our clinicians in performing them. They become the standard of medical practice. Then the patent is issued, and one or two labs get the exclusive licenses, and we can't do the testing for our own patients. 30 It is of course fair to ask why the patent system, or for that matter the health care system, should be concerned at all as to whether Dr. Leonard or her colleagues are permitted to do the testing for their own patients.
31 Shouldn't the concerns be whether patients have access to new diagnostic tests at reasonable prices? If compensation of patent owners indeed results in higher costs to patients, rather than simply lower revenues or reduced sales margins to providers of such tests, should that not be addressed through the health care funding system rather than an amendment to the patent law? Wouldn't that approach be less likely to produce unintended consequences than would an amendment to the patent law? Isn't this issue closely related to current policy discussions regarding prescription drug benefits, and could it not be addressed through mechanisms similar to those currently under discussion with regard to the cost and availability of prescription drugs, rather than through an amendment to the patent law? There is evidence that new molecular diagnostics are emerging that will allow the selection of treatment of diseases, especially cancers, which will avoid for both patient and health-care provider the delay, expense, and debilitating effects of treatments that will not benefit individual patients. Shouldn't these savings be considered in evaluating the effects of gene patents on health care?
It is far from clear that a diagnostic exemption, or compulsory licensing, will result in the greater availability of new molecular diagnostics at reasonable prices. It is likely that the principal beneficiaries of such a legislative change would be the handful of leading global diagnostics companies. These companies would be assured of freedom to operate under gene patents, either for free or at a mandated rate. They would be able to continue to benefit from their installed base of diagnostic testing equipment and their existing sales forces, with much less risk of losing business to emerging competitors who have developed new molecular diagnostics. It is difficult to see how this scenario benefits patients.
In fact, it now appears that the first health care products that benefit directly from genomic research will likely be diagnostics. 32 Companies such as Millennium Predictive Medicine, Celera Diagnostics, diaDexus, and Genomic Health, to name a few, are making rapid progress toward the commercial introduction of new diagnostics developed through genomic approaches to identifying and characterizing genetic markers for disease diagnosis as well as for treatment options. 33 These companies all fit Scherer's profile of those companies for whom the availability of patent protection is likely to be most critical. Absent the availability of patent protection for their novel products, these companies would likely have difficulty persuading investors to invest in them, with the result that they would be correspondingly less likely to bring their products to market. It would be certainly undesirable if these companies were to fail and their products failed to reach the market, to the detriment of patients, based on a patent amendment intended to provide freedom to operate to Dr. Leonard and her counterparts in the clinical genetics community.
Given the concerns raised about gene patent licensing practices, though, it is important to note that in the United States universities are the leading holders of human-gene patents. 34 Given the role that the federal government has played in funding biological research, 35 it is likely that a significant portion of these patents are based on federallyfunded research. Scherer infers that the relatively high rate of gene patenting by U.S. universities, when compared with their non-U.S. counterparts, is attributable to the Bayh-Dole Act.
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It would therefore be possible to address much of the gene patent concerns raised by Murashige, Barton, and Scherer if the largest gene patent holders adopted a policy, either voluntarily or as a result of modifications to the Bayh-Dole Act, that mandated nonexclusive licensing of university-owned gene patents for use in the research field on standard terms. One can certainly argue that to the extent that public funding enabled the innovations claimed in the patents, the public interest in those patents entitles society to a greater role in the way in which they are exploited than would be the case if they were funded entirely with private dollars.
CONCLUSION
Debate on concerns that gene patents inhibit either basic research or the provision of health care in a timely and affordable manner is itself very healthy. However, it is of some very real concern that unsubstantiated assertions about what ''might'' happen if patentees act in a manner that seems both unlikely from an economic point of view as well as destructive from a societal perspective seem to be fueling not only debate but ill-conceived legislative ''fixes'' for ills that do not actually exist.
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Very little, if any, objective evidence exists to support assertions that gene patents have inhibited research, particularly in the context of the dramatic acceleration in research that the availability of patent protection has encouraged. Nowhere is there any objective evidence that any patient has been denied access to available genetic tests due to a patentee's refusal to allow the test to be done. Nowhere is there any objective evidence that research on gene therapies have been inhibited by gene patents. The main issues of the most vocal of the gene patent opponents seem to reduce to their unhappiness that gene patents enable their inventors to recoup their investment in the inventive process by charging royalties for a license to their invention, or that the patentee asserts its right to perform the test itself. It is not seen how this harms patient care at all-rather, at most it seems to prevent the doctors and clinical geneticists from performing these tests for profit, or in a way that competes with the patent holder, without reimbursement to the inventors of those tests.
To the extent that any such concerns might some day be justified by actual facts, it would seem that other, less drastic, measures should be considered before attempting to change the basic principles of patent law in a technology-specific way. Such a process risks running afoul of our commitments to the TRIPS treaty agreements, as well as providing a precedent for unnecessary legislative intervention that will increase the risks, and thus the costs, of all technology improvements-i.e., the progress of science and the useful arts -that the patent statutes were enacted to promote. This would be by far the most damaging and counterproductive outcome in the long run.
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